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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOHNNY WADE DRAWN, Case No. 890253-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
In an opinion filed on May 2, 1990, this Court affirmed 
Appellant's conviction for aggravated robbery and Appellant's 
sentences for that conviction and violation of the firearm 
enhancement statute. A copy of that opinion is attached as 
Appendix A. 
Because that opinion failed to address issues and case 
law raised by Appellant, misstated and omitted material facts, 





THIS COURT FAILED TO REMEDY 
THE VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S 
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION. 
A. THE OPINION OMITS THE ISSUE CONCERNING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
PROHIBITING APPELLANT'S DEMONSTRATION OF THE DISHONEST BEHAVIOR 
OF OFFICER EDWARDS AND THE TRIAL COURT'S BOLSTERING OF OFFICER 
EDWARDS' CREDIBILITY. 
1 For explanation of circumstances in which the right to 
rehearing is exercised, see Utah Court of Appeals Rule 35; Brown 
v. Pickard, denying reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886); Cummings v. 
Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913). 
1 
In Appellant's reply brief, Appellant noted that 
defense counsel was not allowed to present testimony that Officer 
Edwards had behaved in a dishonest manner, and that the trial 
2 
court improperly bolstered the credibility of Officer Edwards* 
Reply brief at page 4 and 5. At oral argument on January 23, 
1990, Appellate counsel, cited to this Court the United States 
Supreme Court case, Kentucky v. Stincer, 428 U.S. 730 (1987), for 
the proposition that in blocking this impeachment of Officer 
Edwards, the trial court violated Appellant's right to 
confrontation. 
2 Officer Edwards presented Appellant's alleged 
confession, as well as the two exculpatory statements of Genora 
Mar and Rosemary Marcellus (T. 148-160). During direct 
examination of a defense witness, Appellant's counsel was 
prohibited from establishing that Officer Edwards had called that 
witness, misrepresenting that he was calling on behalf of defense 
counsel (T.2 54). Cutting off this line of questioning, Judge 
Young raised and sustained a hearsay objection, although it is 
obvious that defense counsel was not attempting to establish the 
truth of the assertion that Officer Edwards was calling on behalf 
of defense counsel (T.2 54). See Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c) 
("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted."). 
The Court bolstered Officer Edwards' testimony 
immediately prior to his recitation of the statements of 
Appellant, Rosemary Mar, and Genora Marcellus, instructing the 
jurors, "[Y]ou may [acjcept that as though that witness were 
testifying." (T. 150). 
3 In Stincer, the Court defined two "two broad, albeit 
not exclusive categories of cases in which the Confrontation 
Clause is violated: "cases involving the admission of out-of-
court statements and cases involving restrictions imposed by law 
or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination.". Id. 
at 737 (emphasis added). While the trial court's ruling cut off 
Appellant's direct examination, the effect of the ruling was to 
prohibit Appellant from impeaching Officer Edwards, and falls 
within the rationale of the Stincer opinion. See Stincer at 738-
739 (discussing how the Confrontation Clause prohibits the 
prohibition of questioning eliciting facts bearing on credibility 
2 
This Court did not mention this in its opinion. See 
Appendix A. 
B. INASMUCH AS THE HONESTY OF OFFICER EDWARDS WAS ESSENTIAL TO 
THE VIABILITY OF THE "CONFESSIONS" SUPPORTING THE VERDICT, AS 
WELL AS TO THE FINDING OF UNAVAILABILITY OF THE HEARSAY 
DECLARANTS, THE ISSUE IS DETERMINATIVE AND MUST BE ADDRESSED. 
In contravention of the Utah Supreme Court's 
admonitions in State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 891 (Utah 1989), 
that confessions should be presented through reliable means, the 
State presented the confession of Appellant and in-custody 
statements of Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar through Officer 
Ron Edwards. After Appellant had argued that his confession 
never happened and objected to the presentation of the 
"confession" through Officer Edwards (S.H. 22-23), the trial 
court improperly bolstered the credibility of Officer Edwards 
prior to his recitation of the in-custody statements, instructing 
the jurors, "[Y]ou may [ac]cept [his testimony] as though that 
witness were testifying." (T. 150). 
Not only were the jurors left to rely exclusively on 
the improperly bolstered and protected honesty of Officer 
Edwards in assessing the in-custody statements of Rosemary Mar, 
Genora Marcellus, and Appellant, but also, the trial court relied 
heavily on Officer Edwards in finding that Rosemary Mar and 
of witnesses)• 
Further, inasmuch as Officer Edwards' testimony was the 
basis of the trial court's ruling that Genora Marcellus and 
Rosemary Mar were unavailable, and that their hearsay statements 
could be admitted, the inability of Appellant to demonstrate the 
dishonesty of Officer Edwards had an additional impact on his 
right to confront Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar. 
3 
Genora Marcellus were unavailable witnesses. When this Court 
followed suit# without any mention of the dishonest behavior of 
Officer Edwards and without mention of the improper bolstering of 
4 
Officer Edwards by the trial court, this Court failed to a 
address a determinative issue and determinative facts. 
C. IN CHARACTERIZING THE "CONFESSIONS" OF ROSEMARY MAR AND GENORA 
MARCELLUS AS STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST, THIS COURT 
MISSTATED UNDISPUTED FACTS, MISINTERPRETED UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 
804(b)(3), AND DIVERGED FROM BINDING FEDERAL PRECEDENT. 
In finding that Appellant's right to confrontation 
under the federal constitution was not violated, this Court erred 
in relying on extrinsic evidence to find the hearsay statements 
of Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar reliable, and in finding 
that the hearsay statements fit within a well-recognized 
exception to the hearsay rule, characterizing the statements the 
declarants intended to exculpate themselves as "confessions" and 
"statements against penal interest". 
4 See Appendix A, page 6 ("Detective Edwards also called 
Marcellus1 s home and spoke with the witness's mother. The 
witness's mother told the officer that he daughter had received 
the subpoena and would be in court on the designated date. 
Detective Edwards also testified that he was "unable to locate 
[Mar] at all." Her last known address was listed as Redwood Road 
apartment complex. A check of the apartment indicated that Mar 
no longer lived there. Detective Edwards's search for Mar 
further consisted of questioning police informants, searching 
police files, and working with a Salt Lake County 
investigator."). 
5 See Appendix A at page 7, quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56, 66 (1980), ("'Reliability can be inferred without more 
in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded at 
least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.'"). 
This Court stated: 
When the statements were made, Mar and 
4 
1. THE RELIABILITY OF HEARSAY STATEMENTS MUST BE FOUND IN THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE, 
In evaluating the reliability of the statements, this 
Court erred in looking to evidence supporting the verdict that 
was completely unrelated to the circumstances in which the 
statements were made. See emphasized portion of this Court's 
opinion in footnote 5. The impropriety of this approach can be 
understood through reference to Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 
544-545 (1986)(evaluating the "circumstances surrounding the 
confession"); State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1355-1356 n.3 (the 
Marcellus were under arrest and suspects in 
the Payless robbery. Their statements were 
substantially similar. Furthermore, other 
witnesses observed a white station wagon 
leaving the crime scene, a black man exiting 
the vehicle before it was pulled over by 
police, and the police discovered money and 
the shotgun near the arrest scene. [Both 
Marcellus and Mar also told Edwards that they 
were waiting in the car when defendant came 
running back and said that he had "just 
robbed a store." The two then stated that 
defendant got into the car, Marcellus drove 
away, and defendant was let out of the car 
before the police detained and arrested the 
two women. Furthermore, both women admitted 
disposing of the money and shotgun before 
being arrested.] The declarations implicated 
defendant, but also subjected the two women 
to prosecution as accomplices. See Utah Code 
Ann. section 76-2-202 (1978)(any person who 
aids another in commission of a crime is 
criminally liable as a party). The witnesses 
also aided defendant's escape and disposed of 
incriminating evidence. The State could have 
prosecuted the two women for the robbery. 
The statements of the women were made against 
penal interest and there was no error in 
admitting them through the testimony of 
Detective Edwards. 
Appendix A page 8 (emphasis added; bracketed portion appears in 
footnote 5 of this Court's opinion). 
5 
court explained that under Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-411(2), in 
determining the reliability of hearsay statements in child sex 
abuse prosecutions, the court should consider factors surrounding 
the making of the statement: "how soon after the event it was 
given, whether the statement was spontaneous, the questions asked 
to elicit it, the number of times the statement was repeated or 
rehearsed, and whether the statement is reproduced verbatim in 
court, viz., tape recording, video tape or otherwise."); and 
State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 204 (Wash. 1984)("Adequate indicia 
of reliability must be found in reference to circumstances 
surrounding the making of the out-of-court statement, and not 
from subsequent corroboration of the criminal act."). 
2. THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MAKING OF THE HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS DO NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF RELIABILITY. 
The circumstances surrounding the statements of 
Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus counsel twice against a finding 
of reliability of those statements: as "confessions" of 
6 
accomplices, the statements are presumed unreliable; and the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the statements do not 
overcome this presumption. 
Finding that the statements were made at all, let alone 
ascertaining the circumstances in which the statements were 
made, requires reference to the improperly bolstered and 
protected testimony of Officer Edwards. See subpoint B, supra. 
Officer Edwards testified that after being briefed on 
6 Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. at 539. 
6 
the case by Officers Newbold and Halverson, he read Rosemary and 
Genora their Miranda rights, and interviewed them without 
recording the statements (he claimed the tape recorder was not 
used at their request) (T.I 148-154). Compare Lee at 544 ("The 
unsworn statement was given in response to the questions of 
police, who, having already interrogated Lee# no doubt knew what 
they were looking for, and the statement was not tested in any 
manner by contemporaneous cross-examination by counsel, or its 
equivalent."). Further, the two statements diverged on the 
critical issue of responsibility for the crime; both of these 
witnesses were minimizing their participation and had ample 
Q 
reason to amplify Appellant's responsibility for the crime. 
3. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT 
STATEMENTS OF ACCOMPLICES ARE NOT "STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL 
INTEREST" FOR PURPOSES OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ANALYSIS; BECAUSE 
THE STATEMENTS WERE EXCULPATORY, THEY DO NOT QUALIFY UNDER THE 
RATIONALE OR RULE OF "STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST." 
In characterizing the statements of Rosemary Mar and 
7 See Appellee1s brief, page 25 n. 9, listing the 
differences between the statements ("(1) witness foreknowledge of 
the robbery; (2) participation in 'casing1 the store; and (3) 
which participant wanted the robbery committed. A fourth 
possible area, also insignificant, is where the car was parked 
prior to the robbery."). 
8 Compare Lee at 545 ("As we have consistently 
recognized, a codefendant*s confession is presumptively 
unreliable as to the passages detailing the defendant's conduct 
or culpability because those passages may well be the product of 
the codefendant's desire to shift or spread the blame, curry 
favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another. If those 
portions of the codefendant's purportedly 'interlocking' 
statement which bear to any significant degree on the defendant's 
participation in the crime are not thoroughly substantiated by 
the defendant's own confession, the admission of those statements 
poses too serious a threat to the accuracy of the verdict to be 
countenanced by the Sixth Amendment."). 
7 
Genora Marcellus as "statements against penal interest", this 
Court was explicitly relying on the federal Sixth Amendment,9 
and yet diverged from the United States Supreme Court ruling that 
for purposes of federal Confrontation Clause analysis, statements 
of accomplices do not satisfy the reliability prong of that 
analysis by falling within the "statements against penal 
^ - 10 interest" rubric. 
In citing the Utah Code (section 76-2-202) for the 
proposition that Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus could have 
11 
been prosecuted as accomplices for the robbery, this Court 
omitted the foundational analysis justifying the "statements 
against interest" exception to the hearsay rule. The content of 
the Utah Code and what a prosecutor could do with the statements 
are not at issue; rather, the state of mind of the hearsay 
declarant must demonstrate that the statement is so far against 
her interest that if it were not true, she would not have made 
•4. 12 it. 
9 Appendix A page 5 n.2. 
10 See Lee at 544 n. 5 ("We reject respondent's 
categorization of the hearsay involved in this case as a simple 
•declaration against penal interest.' That concept defines too 
large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." 
11 Appendix A page 8. 
12 See Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) ("A statement which 
at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject 
him to civil or criminal liability, ... that a reasonable man in 
his position would not have made the statement unless he believed 
it to be true.); State v. Sanders, 496 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah 
1972)(prospect of damage to hearsay declarant substitutes for the 
reliability showing traditionally made through cross-
8 
Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar were not 
magnanimously confessing to a crime# they were trying to 
exculpate themselves (T.2 151-154). Because there is nothing in 
the record demonstrating that Genora and Rosemary bore the 
requisite state of mind when the statements were made# there is 
nothing to support the trial court's or this Court's 
characterization of the statements as "against penal interest." 
Appellant requests rehearing of the issue of the denial 
of his right to confrontation. 
II. 
THIS COURT FAILED TO REMEDY 
THE VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
A. THIS COURT APPLIED AN EXCESSIVELY DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF 
REVIEW. 
As noted at oral argument and omitted from this Court's 
opinion, after defense counsel objected to Micki Horn's in-court 
identification of Appellant, apparently the only black man 
wearing shackles at the defense table in court (see Reply Brief 
at page 7), the trial court did not pause to analyze what this 
Court took two pages to discuss, but simply allowed the 
identification, stating, "If she has any independent recollection 
she can testify to it." (T.57). 
In applying the deferential "abuse of discretion" 
standard of review, this Court granted more deference than was 
due and failed to remind the trial court that in presiding over 
criminal cases, he should engage himself mentally and consider 
examination). 
9 
legal rulings within the analytical framework established by 
appellate courts. 
B. THIS COURT OMITTED DETERMINATIVE FACTS. 
The State has never disputed that facts appearing in 
the record in this case: at the time that Micki Horn made her 
in-court identification of Appellant, he was the only black man 
in shackles sitting at the defense table (Reply Brief page 7). 
After acknowledging the impropriety of the in-court 
13 identification, this Court characterized the trial court's 
careless allowance of the in-court identification as a proper act 
14 
of discretion* This Court then supported this imaginary act of 
discretion, implicitly affirming ruling that was never made, by 
omitting and misstating facts in the record. 
This Court relied on the language of Micki Horn in 
determining that she had an independent recollection of 
Appellant: 
Well, when I walked in I sat down and he 
turned around and it hit me like a ton of 
bricks. I recognized him. And that was it. 
And everything about him—the features—I 
just ... it was him. I just couldn't—I 
don't know. But I recognized him. The way 
he moved, the way his back was over, the 
wrinkles on the forehead, his nose, 
everything. 
(T. 57-58; Appendix A page 3). This Court further substantiated 
13 Appendix A page 4. 
14 See Appendix A page 4 ("We will not reverse a trial 
court's evidentiary rulings absent a showing that the lower court 
abused its discretion."); and page 5 ("We find no abuse of 
discretion in admitting this evidence."). 
10 
the finding that Ms. Horn had an independent recollection: 
The salesperson's in-court identification 
focused not on defendant's face, but rather 
on his features, movements, and forehead 
wrinkles. In her statement to police, made 
on the day of the robbery, she stated that 
the robber "wasn't white," that his "hair and 
skin was [sic] a little dark," and the 
suspect was possibly hispanic or Mexican. 
Defendant is in fact a light-skinned black 
man. The witness was also looking at his 
face "the whole time" during the robbery. 
Appendix A page 4. 
The problem with the analysis is that there is no basis 
for the Court's assumption that the recollection stemmed from the 
robbery, rather than from the lineup, which Ms. Horn attended 
4. 4. ' 1 1 5 
prior to trial. 
During the robbery, the assailant wore two nylons over 
his head and wielded a sawed-off shotgun (T. 51-52). Viewing 
Defense Exhibit 2, this Court can see that Appellant was neither 
wearing two nylons on his head nor wielding a sawed-off shotgun 
at the lineup (nor was the person Ms. Horn identified at the 
line-up or any other participant). While Ms. Horn explained 
that she had her child with her and wasn't wearing her glasses at 
the line-up (T. 56, 67), perhaps her being spun around and 
dragged through the Payless store at gunpoint by someone wearing 
two nylons on the head, and her fumbling with the cash register 
and monitoring two customers and a fellow employee in the store 
during the robbery (T. 52-55) were as distracting to her as were 
15 Ms. Horn could not remember if Appellant was in the 
lineup (T. 61). 
11 
the presence of her child and the absence of her glasses at the 
16 line-up. 
While this Court indicated that "The witness was also 
17 
looking at his face 'the whole time1 during the robbery", the 
record reflects a much more limited examination of Appellant's 
face during the robbery: 
Q Did you ever get a look at this 
individual's face? 
A Yes, I did, a good look. 
Q When? 
A When he was pointing the gun at me 
telling me if I set off the alarm and he was 
going to blow me in half I was looking right 
at his face the whole time. 
Q That was through the nylon stockings? 
A Yes. 
(T. 55). 
This Court's footnote indicating that any error present 
18 
was cured by the Long instruction must be reconsidered in light 
of the fact that Ms. Horn was the first witness to testify, and 
19 
expressed a great deal of certainty in her identification. 
Appellant requests rehearing of the issue of the denial 
16 There is apparently nothing in the record to indicate 
that she was wearing her glasses during the robbery or at trial. 
Indeed, if Ms. Horn was wearing her glasses at trial, it is 
curious that she had to explain to the jurors, "I wear glasses 
and I didn't have my glasses on [at the lineup].11 TTT 
67)(emphasis added). 
17 Appendix A page 4. 
18 Appendix A page 4 n.l. 
19 See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490-492 and n.5 (Utah 
1986)(Explaining that jurors don't follow these instructions, and 
explaining that research supports the assertion that "[T]he 
accuracy of an identification is, a times, inversely related to 
the confidence with which it is made."). 
12 
of his right to due process. 
III. 
THIS COURT FAILED TO PROTECT 
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS AGAINST 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 
This Court upheld the trial court's dual consecutive 
sentences for Appellant's use of a firearm during a robbery, 
noting the legislative intent for "imposing an additional 
20 
penalty when a firearm is used in a commission of a felony." 
Appellant requests this Court to address the issue 
raised on pages 39 through 42 of his opening brief and pages 17 
and 18 of his reply brief, namely: if the firearm enhancement 
statute does not create a new crime and impose a redundant 
punishment (in violation of Double Jeopardy principles), why# 
after finding that the actus reus of using a firearm during the 
robbery was committed/ and after imposing the sentence for 
aggravated robbery, was it lawful for the trial court impose a 
separate, consecutive sentence for that actus reus under the 
firearm "enhancement" statute? See Utah Code Ann. section 76-6 
302 (1978); section 76-3-203; State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137 
(Utah 1989); and State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978). 
CONCLUSION 
I hereby certify that the foregoing petition is 
submitted in good faith and not for delay. 
JAMES A. VALDEZ' 
Attorney for Appellant 
20 Appendix A pages 8-9. 
13 
Attorney fc^ r Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that \) copies 
of the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals 
and that four copies of the foregoing will be delivered to the 
Attorney General's Office# 236. State Capitol, Salt Lake City# 
Utah, 84114 , this h day of 
DELIVERED by this 
day of 1990. 
14 
APPENDIX A 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
State of Utah# 
Plaintiff and Appellee/ 
v. 
Johnny Wade Drawn, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
F I L E D 
w »»yT.Noon«n 
Njfcrk of ** Court 
Uttft C«uft * Appeals 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890253-CA 
Third District/ Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: James A. Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook# Salt Lake 
City# for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Charlene Barlow# Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davidson, Billings/ and Orme. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his conviction of aggravated robbery. He 
argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress a 
witness's in-court identification of defendant/ by admitting 
hearsay statements of unavailable witnesses/ and by enhancing 
his sentence for the use of a firearm. We affirm. 
On August 21# 1988, a man entered the Payless Shoe Store 
located in Magna, Utah# wearing pink-and beige-colored nylon 
stockings over his head and carrying a sawed-off shotgun. Two 
salespersons were working at the time. The man ordered one 
salesperson to hand over all the money in the register and the 
other salesperson to take all the money out of the safe and 
place it in a corduroy bag. The salesperson working at the 
register testified that she was looking at the man's face Mthe 
whole time." The second salesperson only viewed the man 
briefly. 
After the robbery, a woman driving through the mall parking 
lot observed a man wearing something pink on his head, running 
alongside the Payless Shoe Store attempting to shove something 
into a bag. The witness observed the man enter a small white 
station wagon driven by a black woman and watched the car exit 
the parking lot heading southbound on 5600 West and later 
turning west on 3500 South. She reported this information to 
the police after discovering that the shoe store had been 
robbed. She later identified the car after the police had 
detained the car and its occupants. 
Several blocks from the robbery, a fourth witness observed 
a light-skinned black man exit a white compact station wagon. 
Several minutes later, he observed a police officer pull the 
station wagon over and handcuff the vehicle's two remaining 
female occupants. After observing this, he drove down the road 
where he observed the same black man. The witness lost sight 
of the man for about fifteen or twenty minutes, but later 
observed the same man wearing different clothing. The witness 
thereafter lost sight of the black man. 
West Valley City Police Officer Kory Newbold responded to 
the Payless robbery. While driving to Payless he observed a 
possible suspect vehicle travelling in the opposite direction. 
The officer turned around, and pursued the vehicle. He 
momentarily lost sight of the vehicle but later found it on a 
side street and pulled it over. He questioned the two black 
female occupants, but released them because they did not match 
the reported description. Upon returning to the patrol car, 
the officer received updated information on the suspects and 
getaway vehicle. With this knowledge, he again pulled the 
vehicle over and this time arrested the occupants. 
At the arrest scene, one witness identified the car as the 
getaway vehicle, another recognized one of the women suspects 
as having been in the shoe store earlier in the day. The bag 
of money and the shotgun used in the robbery were also found 
near the scene of arrest. At the police station, the two 
suspects were interviewed by Detective Ron Edwards of the West 
Valley City Police Department. Detective Edwards later 
testified that both women admitted that they waited in the car 
while defendant robbed the shoe store. Edwards also testified 
that both women told him that after the robbery, they 
momentarily evaded police, let defendant out, and threw the 
money bag and gun out the window. Neither woman testified at 
trial. Instead, their testimony was admitted through Detective 
Edwards under the unavailability exception to the hearsay 
rule. See Utah R. Evid. 804. 
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Defendant was arrested the day after the robbery and was 
questioned by Detective Edwards, Detective Edwards later 
testified that defendant confessed to the robbery after asking 
defendant's parole officer and another police officer to leave 
the interrogation room. Neither the testimony of the two women 
nor defendant's testimony was recorded. 
Two lineups were held several weeks after the robbery. 
None of the witnesses brought to the lineup could identify 
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. At trial, however, 
one of the Payless employees identified defendant as the 
robber. Over defendant's objections, her in-court 
identification was allowed. 
IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION 
Defendant first argues that the court erred in not 
suppressing the witness's in-court identification. He contends 
that the identification, made while defendant was sitting at 
counsel table, was impermissibly suggestive and denied him a 
fair trial. Although the witness previously failed to identify 
defendant at a lineup, at trial she claimed to have independent 
recollection of defendant as the perpetrator of the crime: 
Well, when I walked in I sat down and he 
turned around and it hit me like a ton of 
bricks. I recognized him. And that was 
it. And everything about him—the 
features—I just . . . it was him. I just 
couldn't—I don't know. But I recognized 
him. The way he moved, the way his back 
was over, the wrinkles on the forehead, 
his nose, everything. 
The suggestiveness of the witness's in-court identification 
is reviewed under the totality of the circumstances. Manson v. 
Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977); Neil v. Bicrcrers, 409 U.S. 
188, 199 (1972); State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989); 
State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 1980). We apply a 
two-part test to determine if identification procedures are 
impermissibly suggestive: 
[W]as [the identification procedure] so 
impermissively suggestive as to give rise 
to a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification . . . . 
[I]f the [identification procedure was] 
impermissibly suggestive, then the 
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in-court identification must be based on 
an untainted, independent foundation to be 
reliable. 
Thamer, 777 P.2d at 435. Here, the in-court identification was 
suggestive and carried a likelihood of misidentification. See 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487-88 (Utah 1986). We therefore 
apply the second prong of the Thamer test to determine if the 
identification was -based on an untainted, independent 
foundation."* Thamer, 777 P.2d at 435. We will not reverse a 
trial court's evidentiary rulings absent a showing that the 
lower court abused its discretion. See, e.g., State v. Barela, 
779 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In considering the likelihood of misidentification, we 
review the following factors: 
the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witness' [s] degree of attention, the 
accuracy of the witnesses] prior 
description of the criminal, the level of 
certainty demonstrated by the witness at 
the confrontation, and the length of time 
between the crime and the confrontation. 
Long. 721 P.2d at 491 (quoting Neilr 409 U.S. at 199).' 
The salesperson^ in-court identification focused not on 
defendant's face, but rather on his features, movements, and 
forehead wrinkles. In her statement to police, made on the day 
of the robbery, she stated that the robber -wasn't white,- that 
his -hair and skin was [sic] a little dark,- and the suspect 
was possibly hispanic or Mexican. Defendant is in fact a 
light-skinned black man. The witness was also looking at his 
face -the whole time- during the robbery. There is no serious 
inconsistency between the prior description and the subsequent 
in-court identification to make the identification 
unreliable.1 
1. In addition, any possible error attributable to the alleged 
misidentification was cured by the detailed jury instruction 
which properly appraised the jury of the inherent limitations 
of eyewitness identification. The instruction given in this 
case was taken verbatim from State v. Long. 721 P.2d at 494 
n.8. The Utah Supreme Court expressly approved this 
instruction as satisfying the need for cautionary instructions 
in eyewitness identification cases. 
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While defendant's presence at counsel table may have been 
suggestive, we cannot say that under the totality of 
circumstances there was Ha very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification," since an adequate independent 
basis for the identification exists. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116 
(quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390 (1968)). 
-The defect, if there be one, goes to weight and not to 
substance.- Id. at 117. We find no abuse of discretion in 
admitting this evidence. 
ADMISSION OF HEARSAY STATEMENTS 
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by admitting the hearsay statements of Rosemary Mar 
and Genova Marcellus, the two women arrested in the getaway 
car. He contends that the State neither proved unavailability 
nor that the testimony bore sufficient indicia of reliability. 
He maintains that admission of this evidence violates his right 
to confrontation guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the 
United States Constitution and article I section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution.2 
Hearsay statements of a witness are admissible at trial 
provided the State can show the witness's unavailability and 
prove that the statement bears adequate indicia of 
reliability. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); State v. 
Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1982); State v. Brooks. 638 
P.2d 537 (Utah 1981); Barela, 779 P.2d at 1142; Utah R. Evid. 
804. With narrow exceptions, the confrontation clause 
guarantees the accused "the right . . . to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him . . . .* U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
Indeed, in the usual case, the State "must either produce, or 
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose 
statement it wishes to use against defendant." Roberts. 448 
U.S. at 65; £££ also Webb. 779 P.2d at 1113. 
Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5) provides: 
-Unavailability as a witness" includes 
situations in which the declarant: 
2. Defendant does not contend that the analysis under the Utah 
Constitution is any different from the analysis under the 
federal constitution. We therefore review his argument under 
the federal constitution. State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 1108, 1111 
n.4 (Utah 1989). 
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(5) is absent from the hearing and the 
proponent of his statement has been unable 
to procure his attendance by process or 
other reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a 
witness if his exemption/ refusal/ claim 
of lack of memory/ inability/ or absence 
is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of 
the proponent of his statement for the 
purpose of preventing the witness from 
attending or testifying. 
The State bears the burden of proving unavailability by 
competent evidence. Barela, 779 P.2d at 1142. M[F]or a 
witness to be constitutionally unavailable, it must be 
practically impossible to produce the witness in court. It is 
not enough to show that the witness would be uncomfortable on 
the stand or that testifying would be stressful." I£. at 
1142-43 (quoting Webb, 779 P.2d at 1113). 
Here, the deputy county attorney subpoenaed each witness 
three times prior to trial.3 Detective Edwards also called 
Marcellus's home and spoke with the witness's mother. The 
witness's mother told the officer that her daughter had 
received the subpoena and would be in court on the designated 
date. Detective Edwards also testified that he was "unable to 
locate [Mar] at all." Her last known address was listed as a 
Redwood Road apartment complex. A check of the apartment 
indicated that Mar no longer lived there. -Detective Edwards's 
search for Mar further consisted of questioning police 
informants/ searching police files/ and working with a Salt 
Lake County investigator. All of his efforts were unsuccessful. 
We conclude that the State's efforts comply with the 
hearsay exception unavailability requirements. See Webb, 779 
P.2d at 1113, The State subpoenaed each witness several times, 
attempted to make personal contact/ and used informants and 
3. The Marcellus subpoenas were sent to the home of the 
witness's mother. Subsequent communications between the county 
attorney's office and Marcellus's mother indicate that 
Marcellus/ who was defendant's friend/ received the subpoenas 
and intended to attend the trial. The Mar subpoenas were sent 
to her last known address but were returned by the post office 
as undeliverable. 
890253-CA 6 
other police resources to locate them, all of which proved 
unsuccessful. Despite the State's good faith efforts neither 
witness could be located nor produced in court. See icl. 
We next determine if the unavailable witness statements 
bear adequate -indicia of reliability.- -Reliability can be 
inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within 
a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the 
evidence must be excluded at least absent a showing of 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.- Roberts, 448 
U.S. at 66. The State contends that the witnesses made 
statements against their penal interest which fall within a 
rooted hearsay exception. 
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3) provides: 
The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness: 
(3) A statement which was at the time of 
its making so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary 
interest, or so far tended to subject him 
to civil or criminal liability, . . . that 
a reasonable man in his position would not 
have made the statement unless he believed 
it to be true. A statement tending to 
expose the declarant to criminal liability 
and offered to exculpate the accused is 
not admissible unless corroborating 
circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement. 
In determining if a statement is one made against penal 
interest/ we look to the circumstances-y<:nder which the statement 
was given. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 279 (3rd ed. 
1984). Statements that would not subject a person to criminal 
liability, Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3), or statements made in an 
obvious attempt to curry favor with the authorities by 
inculpating defendant and exculpating declarant, lack 
trustworthiness.4 See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 
4. Some jurisdictions have imposed additional safeguards by 
requiring both inculpatory and exculpatory statements to be 
corroborated. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 279 (1984). 
See also United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1170 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
7 
(1986) (codefendant's confession, which was given only after he 
was told defendant had implicated him, was presumptively 
unreliable); Fed, R. Evid. 804, Notes of Advisory Committee on 
Proposed Rules, 
We review the trial judge's admission of this evidence 
under the clear abuse of discretion standard. Brooks. 638 P.2d 
at 539 (Utah 1981). 
We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the 
hearsay statements. When the statements were made, Mar and 
Marcellus were under arrest and suspects in the Payless 
robbery. Their statements were substantially similar. 
Furthermore, other witnesses observed a white station wagon 
leaving the crime scene, a black man exiting the vehicle before 
it was pulled over by police, and the police discovered money 
and the shotgun near the arrest scene.* The declarations 
implicated defendant, but also subjected the two women to 
prosecution as accomplices. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(1978) (any person who aids another in commission of a crime is 
criminally liable as a party). The witnesses also aided 
defendant's escape and disposed of incriminating evidence. The 
State could have prosecuted the two women for the robbery. The 
statements of the women were made against penal interest and 
there was no error in admitting them through the testimony of 
Detective Edwards. 
CUMULATIVE SENTENCES 
Defendant next argues that the imposition of a five year 
sentence for the use of a firearm in addition to the sentence 
for aggravated robbery is impermissible. He argues that the 
firearm enhancement cannot be applied where an element of the 
underlying crime is the use of a firearm. 
Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have recently 
ruled that imposition of the firearms enhancement penalty in 
aggravated robbery cases is permissible and comports with the 
legislature's intent in imposing an additional penalty when a 
5. Both Marcellus and Mar also told Edwards that they were 
waiting in the car when defendant came running back and said 
that he had "just robbed a store.H The two then stated that 
defendant got into the car, Marcellus drove away, and defendant 
was let out of the car before the police detained and arrested 
the two women. Furthermore, both women admitted disposing of 
the money and shotgun before being arrested. 
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firearm is used in the commission of a felony. State v. Russell, 
132 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 15 (Utah 1990); State v. Webb, 131 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 41, 53-54 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The legislature has clearly expressed its intention to more 
severely punish all felons who use a firearm. Russell, 132 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 15. Defendant's sentence has not been doubly 
enhanced in a manner inconsistent with the legislature's intent 
nor is that intent ambiguous to any extent. Rather, he was 
convicted of aggravated robbery but was given an enhanced 
sentence because a firearm was used to commit the crime. 
We find no error in the trial court's rulings and 
accordingly affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
i t h M. B i l l i ngs , Judged 
6£ % -*p«1i *+•* ^ 
Gregor jz^ . Orme, Judge 
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APPENDIX B 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment Six 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 (1978) 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a 
deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first 
degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be 
deemed to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if 
it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first 
degree, for a term at not less than five 
years, unless otherwise specifically provided 
by law, and which may be for life but if the 
trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile 
or the representation of a firearm was used 
in the commission or furtherance of the 
felony, the court shall additionally sentence 
the person convicted for a term of one year 
to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and the court may additionally sentence the 
person convicted for an indeterminate term of 
one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally 
sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years 
to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the 
second degree, for a term at not less than 
one year nor more than 15 years but if the 
trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile 
or the representation of a firearm was used 
in the commission or furtherance of the 
felony, the court shall additionally sentence 
the person convicted for a term of one year 
to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and the court may additionally sentence the 
person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively 
and not concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third 
degree, for a term not to exceed five years 
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a 
facsimile or the representation of a firearm 
was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court may additionally 
sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years 
to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment for a felony in which 
a firearm was used or involved in the 
accomplishment of the felony and is 
convicted of another felony when a firearm 
was used or involved in the accomplishment of 
the felony shall, in addition to any other 
sentence imposed, be sentenced for an 
indeterminate term to be not less than five 
nor more than ten years to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
Utah Court of Appeals Rule 35 
...The petition [for rehearing] shall state with 
particularity the points of law or fact which the 
petitioner claims the court has overlooked or 
misapprehended and shall contain such argument in 
support of the petition as the petitioner so desires. 
Counsel for the petitioner must certify that the 
petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c) 
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) 
[In order to qualify under the statement against 
interest exception to the hearsay rule, a statement 
must be a] statement which at the time of its making so 
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or 
proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him 
to civil or criminal liability, .•• that a reasonable 
man in his position would not have made the statement 
unless he believed it to be true. 
